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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Charlynda Goggin (hereinafter Charlynda) was convicted on 
four counts following a jury trial, to wit, conspiracy to deliver a controlled 
substance (synthetic cannabinoid), delivery of a controlled substance, conspiracy 
to deliver drug paraphernalia, and delivery of drug paraphernalia. The district 
court denied a post trial motion for acquittal on all counts, but granted a motion 
for new trial on the two conspiracy counts (but not on the substantive counts), 
ruling that it had mis-instructed the jury. 
Appellant timely appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to 
support any of the verdicts and that judgments of acquittal should have been 
entered on all four counts, or, in the alternative, that the court should have 
granted a new trial on the substantive counts as well. 
Course Proceedings 
Charlynda was charged by indictment with conspiracy to manufacture, 
deliver or possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance in violation of I.C. 
§§ 37-2732(a), 18-1701, and 37-2732(f); conspiracy to deliver or possess with 
intent to deliver drug paraphernalia in violation of I.C. §§ 37-27348, 18-1701; 
delivery of a controlled substance in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a); and delivery of 
drug paraphernalia in violation of I.C. §§ 37-27348. (R. p. 490.) 
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Her case was consolidated with co-defendants Morgan Alley, Tashina 
Alley, Cadee Peterson, Matthew Taylor, Hieu Phan, and Tonya Williams.1 
Prior to trial, Morgan Alley filed a motion to dismiss Goined in by Charlynda 
and others) asserting that one of the synthetic cannabinoids found, to wit, AM-
2201, is not a schedule I substance. The district court disagreed and held in a 
memorandum decision that AM-2201 is a schedule I controlled substance and 
the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.2 (R. p. 700.) 
Four defendants proceeded to jury trial, to wit, Charlynda, Tashina Alley, 
Cadee Peterson, and Matthew Taylor. At the close of the State's evidence, 
Charlynda made a Rule 29 motion for entry of judgments of acquittal pursuant to 
ICR 29, which was denied. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2526-2546. Charlynda (and the other 
defendants) was ultimately convicted on all counts. (R. p. 920-925.) 
Thereafter, Charlynda filed for judgment of acquittal on all charges. (R. p. 
926.) She also filed a separate motion for new trial. (R. p. 928-929.) After full 
briefing, the court issued a memorandum decision which denied the motion for 
judgment of acquittal, but granted a new trial on the two conspiracy counts, 
although it denied the motion for new trial as to the two substantive counts. (R. p. 
1 On appeal, Charlynda's case has been consolidated with that of Mathew Taylor 
(docket no. 40553), but only for the purposes of the clerk's record and transcripts. 
(R. p. 2.) However, since Appellant's opening brief in that case does a good job 
describing the overall evidence in the trial, Charlynda will repeat most of that 
description of facts while adding some facts relevant to her. 
2 After this ruling, Morgan Alley entered into a plea agreement which apparently 
reserved his right to appeal this decision, since it is the subject of his appeal in 
State v. Alley, No. 40428. Relevant here, since he had already pled guilty, 
Morgan Alley ultimately testified as a State's witness in Charlynda's trial. 
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1017.) The court found that it had failed to instruct the jury that a good faith 
belief that the object crime was not illegal is a defense to conspiracy. The Court 
found that the failure to properly instruct the jury was both an error in the 
instructions to the jury and an error in the decision of a question of law. (R. p. 
1015.) 
Charlynda was sentenced on the two substantive counts (delivery of a 
controlled substance and delivery of drug paraphernalia) to an aggregate term of 
five years, with the first two fixed and the remaining three indeterminate, but the 
Court suspended the sentence and placed her on probation for a period of five 
years. (R. p. 1022.) As a condition of probation Charlynda was also sentenced 
to serve 118 days in jail with credit for 118 days already served pre-trial. (R. p. 
1024.) 
Charlynda timely appeals. (R. p. 1031.) The State cross appeals from the 
order granting a new trial. (R. p. 1037.) 
Statement of Facts 
On September 8, 2011, Detective Andreoli began investigating activities at 
a leased warehouse in Boise. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1074, In. 17 - p. 1076, In. 24. Over 
time, police observed the warehouse and those coming and going from it and, on 
multiple occasions, seized trash discarded outside of it. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1146, In. 7 
- p. 1223, In. 16. In the course of following people who had been seen at the 
warehouse, the police expanded their surveillance to include a residence and a 
business, The Red Eye Hut. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1224, In. 11 - p. 1244, In. 15. 
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Morgan Alley testified at Charlynda's trial that he was the lessee of the 
warehouse, an occupant of the residence, and the registered agent of the LLC 
which owned The Red Eye Hut. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1249, In. 11-23; p. 1259, In. 6-22. 
Mr. Alley's wife is co-defendant Tashina Alley, and Charlynda is Tashina's 
sister, making Charlynda Morgan Alley's sister-in-law. Tr. Vol. III, p. 1916, In. 1-
p. 1917, In. 20. Mr. Alley explained that Charlynda sometimes lived at his 
residence with his wife and children, for example, if she was fighting with her 
boyfriend and didn't have anywhere else to go. Tr. Vol. III, p. 1917, In. 8-14; Tr. 
Vol. III, p. 1920, In. 5-8. Charlynda's two children would also stay with them, 
and Charlynda would sleep on the couch. Tr. Vol. III, p. 1919, In. 16-p. 1920, In. 
8; p. 2087, In. 23-p. 2088, In. 4. 
Mr. Alley testified that he had been using the warehouse to make Twizted 
Potpourri. To make the potpourri, he applied a chemical to otherwise legal plant 
material. He had spoken with people who had paid a chemist to determine which 
chemicals he could legally use in Idaho. Pursuant to that consultation and 
knowing that AM-2201 was being sold throughout the state, such as in gas 
stations, Mr. Alley believed the substance AM-2201 could be applied to plant 
leaves and sold without any violation of state law. Tr. Vol. III, p. 1931, In. 2-10; p. 
1993, In. 1-18. 
Mr. Alley testified that in the warehouse he would pack legal plant material 
into a pitcher. He would spray the material with AM-2201, pour on acetone, and 
leave everything to dry for a couple of days. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2030, In. 19-25. No 
one else was ever present when he did this. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2034, In. 19-21. After 
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the material dried, he would transfer it to tubs where he flavored it with tobacco 
flavoring to provide scents. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2037, In. 1-24. Mr. Alley hired several 
people, including Charlynda, to package and label the resulting product which he 
named Twizted Potpourri. Tr. Vol. III, p. 1990, In. 13-p. 1991, In. 4; p. 1996, In. 
14 - p. 1999, In. 25. He testified that he basically told them that everything they 
were doing was completely legal. Tr. Vol. III, p. 1991, In. 20-23. Charlynda 
worked at the warehouse for two or three weeks, maybe, and was paid $9 per 
hour. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2088, In. 5-12. Mr. Alley testified that at the time he decided 
to offer Charlynda a job at the warehouse, he was aware that she was (and had 
been) unemployed and it was not easy for her, financially speaking. Tr. Vol. III, p. 
2087, In. 13-22. 
Mr. Alley wholesaled his product both in and out of state and in mid-
September started selling it at his newly opened shop, The Red Eye Hut. Tr. Vol. 
III, p. 2008, In. 8 - p. 2009, In. 10. The Red Eye Hut sold candy, snacks, drinks, 
tobacco, blankets, potpourri, scales, drug testing kits, and a variety of glass and 
metal items including pipes. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1098, In. 6 - p. 1100, In. 24. 
In total, The Red Eye Hut was open for only six days. Mr. Morgan testified 
that his sister-in-law (Charlynda) was struggling and she did not have a job, so 
he hired her. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2009, In. 19-24. Mr. Alley testified that when The 
Red Eye Hut opened Charlynda continued to assist him there, and was still paid 
$9 or $10 per hour. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2088, In. 13-p. 2089, In. 1. However, Mr. Alley 
was not sure if he had even paid Charlynda for working there because of his 
arrest. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2019, In. 13-p. 2020, In. 13. While her duties included 
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being a cashier, Mr. Alley characterized her as "pretty much" being the manager 
of the store. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2128, In. 2-5. Mr. Alley testified that Charlynda might 
have also helped him hand out fliers. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2023, In. 9-16. 
Mr. Alley instructed Charlynda that if anyone came in the store acting as if 
he or she was planning to use the products like the pipes illegally; she was to 
kick the person out. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2020, In. 14 - p. 2021, In. 11, p. 2102, In. 13 -
p. 2103, In. 4, p. 2105, In. 23 - p. 2106, In. 7. 
Mr. Alley showed Charlynda a lab report which he told her was scientific 
proof that the potpourri did not contain anything illegal and told her to feel free to 
show the lab report to anyone who was interested, including law enforcement. 
Tr. Vol. III, p. 2090, In. 15-p. 2091, In. 3. Mr. Alley apparently did not tell anyone 
that he put AM-2201 or any other controlled substance on the potpourri and 
rather, he told all his warehouse employees that what they were doing was legal. 
Tr. Vol. III, p. 2102, In. 13 - p. 2103, In. 5. 
Mr. Alley testified that he sold each container of Twizted Potpourri out of 
the store for from $5 to $15. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2022, In. 17-19. He testified that the 
last quantity of synthetic cannabinoid chemical he ordered cost around $35,000. 
Tr. Vol. III, p. 2032, In. 22 -po 2033, In. 3. 
Mr. Alley testified regarding what the State was calling paraphernalia, that 
as long as it is not being sold as drug paraphernalia, it is legal. It could be used 
to smoke tobacco, or marijuana in states where it is legal, or other legal plant 
material, and he mentioned a website called Legalbuzz.com which sold plant 
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materials which can be smoked which are legal. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2092, In. 22-p. 
2093, In. 21. 
Detective Holtry testified that he and another undercover officer (Detective 
Harmon) entered The Red Eye Hut undercover and interacted with Charlynda as 
a salesperson, and that they talked about some of the products and she showed 
and/or demonstrated various things they were interested in. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2146, 
In. 4-15. Detective Harmon testified that Charlynda told them that the Twizted 
Potpourri came from out of state and that it is legal. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2256, In. 2-6. 
Detective Harmon purchased three containers of Twizted Potpourri and a metal 
pipe and paid Charlynda for them. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2256, In. 10-12; 2260, In. 10-15. 
Detective Andreoli testified that spice or potpourri had not always been 
illegal. The law changed as of March 2011 based upon an emergency rule. Tr. 
Vol. III, p. 2378, In. 17 - p. 2380, In. 6. While one of the State's forensic 
chemists appeared to believe that the law now prohibited all synthetic 
cannabinoids in Idaho, Tr. Vol. III, p. 2453, In. 16-20, the State's other chemist 
testified that only some synthetic cannabinoids are illegal in Idaho. Tr. Vol. III, p. 
2450, In. 7-9. 
It was established at trial that one could not tell that there was a synthetic 
cannabinoid applied to plant material visually or by smell, and it required a gas 
chromatograph to determine the presence of synthetic cannabinoids. Tr. Vol. III, 
p 2446, In. 18-p. 2448, In. 8. 
Eventually, search warrants were executed on the warehouse, the Alleys' 
residence, and the store. Approximately 30,000 containers of potpourri were 
7 
seized from the warehouse. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2298, In. 10-24. Nine thousand three 
hundred and sixty-six containers of potpourri and 340 pipes were found in the 
store. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2158, In. 6 - p. 2160, In. 10. 
Detective Andreoli testified that after her arrest, he interviewed 
Charlynda. She explained her duties as opening the store each morning and 
remaining in full control of it until she was later relieved by Morgan Alley. Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 1432, In. 16-19. After some initial waffling, she admitted selling Twizted 
Potpourri and a pipe to Detective Harmon. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1433, In. 22-25. She 
admitted working at the warehouse and described her job as affixing the stickers 
to the lids of the containers, but there were also times she weighed and filled the 
containers or put the lids on as well. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1435, In. 3-13. When asked if 
she personally used Twizted Potpourri she smiled and said. "It's not for human 
consumption." And when asked what the intended use of it was, said "I'm not 
going to say it" and said further that she would just agree that she and the 
detective both know what it was intended for. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1435, In. 19-p. 1436, 
In. 2. 
8 
ISSUES 
I. 
WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTIONS 
II. 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL AS TO THE DELIVERY COUNTS 
9 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS 
A. Standard of review 
Charlynda did make a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal based on 
insufficient evidence at the end of the State's case and made a renewed motion 
for judgment of acquittal post trial. However, Idaho law is clear that the 
sufficiency of the evidence need not be challenged below in order to raise the 
issue on appeal. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873 (1995); State v. Ashley, 126 
Idaho 694 (Ct. App. 1995). 
As to the standard of review for this issue, State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570 
(Ct. App. 2007), explained as follows: 
Appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is 
limited. A jury verdict will not be set aside if it is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence upon which a rational trier of 
fact could find all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We may not substitute our opinion for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony. 
The facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. 
Id. at p. 572. 
It is well established that without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every element, a defendant's rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments are violated. See, In Re: Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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B. There was insufficient evidence to support the convictions 
While a new trial was granted on the two conspiracy counts (but not the 
substantive counts), Appellant nevertheless asserts that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the four convictions in violation of her Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights and that the district court erred in denying the 
motion, and renewed motion, for judgment of acquittal. 
Again, Charlynda was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or 
possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance in violation of I.C. §§ 37-
2732(a), 18-1701, and 37-2732(f); conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to 
deliver drug paraphernalia in violation of I.C. §§ 37-2734B, 18-1701; delivery of a 
controlled SUbstance in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a); and delivery of drug 
paraphernalia in violation of I.C. §§ 37-2734B. 
Idaho law is clear that while controlled substance offenses are general 
intent crimes (although conspiracies regarding them are specific intent crimes), 
the defendant nevertheless must have knowledge of the presence of a controlled 
substance. As the Court of Appeals explained in State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 
62 (Ct. App. 2005): 
In order to secure a conviction for possession of methamphetamine 
in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c) , the State must prove that the 
defendant knowingly possessed the controlled substance, i.e., that 
the defendant had knowledge of the presence of a drug. State v. 
Blake, 133 Idaho 237,241-42,985 P.2d 117,121-22 (1999); State 
v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993); State v. 
Groce, 133 Idaho 144,151,983 P.2d 217, 224 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Thus, the defendant's ignorance of the presence of the substance, 
or mistaken belief that it was an innocuous material, if believed by 
the jury, would be exculpatory. I.C. § 18-201(1). n1 For example, 
one who truly believed that the powdery substance in a package 
was a harmless item, such as sugar, could not be convicted of 
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possession. Blake, 133 Idaho at 242, 985 P.2d at 122. The 
requisite knowledge of the presence of a controlled substance may 
be proved by direct evidence or may be inferred from the 
circumstances. Id.; State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 521, 887 P.2d 
57, 66 (Ct. App. 1994). 
n1 Idaho Code § 18-201 provides in pertinent part: All 
persons are capable of committing crimes, except those 
belonging to the following classes: 
1. Persons who committed the act or made the 
omission charge, under an ignorance or mistake of 
fact which disproved any criminal intent. 
Id., p. 64-65 (emphasis in the original). 
However, as explained in State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698 (Ct. App. 2005), 
the State need not prove that a defendant knew the exact nature of the controlled 
substance possessed or delivered, only that it be an il/egal substance. So for 
example, it is sufficient that the defendant believed he is possessing cocaine 
under the mistaken belief that it is methamphetamine. 
In short, the defense in our case was that Charlynda did not know the 
nature of the substance that had been placed on the otherwise legal plant 
material (a mistake of fact), not that she knew what it was, but erroneously 
believed it was not a controlled substance (a mistake of law). 
Accordingly, if Charlynda did not know the product she was selling 
contained a synthetic cannabinoid then she could not be guilty of the crime of 
delivery of a controlled substance, since she would not have the general intent 
which requires the defendant to know that what she delivers is a controlled 
substance. Nor could she be guilty of the crime of conspiracy to deliver a 
controlled substance, since that requires an agreement to break the law by 
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delivering a controlled substance, which obviously cannot be met if the defendant 
does not know it is a controlled substance which will be delivered. 
Likewise, Charlynda could not be found guilty of delivery of paraphernalia 
for selling a pipe with the Twizted Potpourri because if she did not know that a 
controlled substance had been placed on the potpourri, then she would not know 
that the pipe was intended to ingest a controlled substance. And of course, the 
same is true for the conspiracy to deliver drug paraphernalia, she cannot be 
guilty of agreeing to break the law if she does not know the delivery of the 
paraphernalia breaks the law. 
More specifically, the defense argued below, inter alia, that the State 
presented evidence from Morgan Alley that he told Charlynda that the materials 
she was handling were legal, going as far as to show her a lab report as scientific 
proof. So not only was there no evidence that she knew the plant material 
contained a controlled substance, the evidence was to the contrary. (R. p. 988.) 
Thus, there was no evidence (much less substantial evidence) of any agreement 
to intentionally commit a crime. (R. p. 933.) Further, the defense argued that 
there are many materials in existence which are legal and cause a high (and 
gives examples). More significant, however, is that the State's own expert 
testified that there are synthetic cannabinoids which are not controlled 
substances. (R. p. 992.) In other words, simply because something is called 
spice or potpourri, or even if it contains synthetic cannabinoid, that does not 
make it a controlled substance. (R. p. 993.) 
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As to the delivery of a controlled substance count, the defense argued that 
there was no substantial evidence that Charlynda knew that the potpourri 
contained any controlled substance, and in fact, was told that it was legal. In 
short, the State failed in its burden to prove that Charlynda knew that the Twizted 
Potpourri was a controlled substance. (R. p. 934; 994.) 
The same is true about the delivery of drug paraphernalia, the State did 
not prove that she knew or should have known that it would be used to ingest a 
controlled substance. (R. p. p. 934; 994.) In other words, if the potpourri was 
legal, then even if she should have known the pipe sold with it was to ingest it, 
the pipe would not have been illegal paraphernalia since it would not be used to 
ingest a controlled substance.3 
Again, the district court denied the motion for acquittal as to all counts. 
The essential basis for its ruling as to every count was that there was substantial 
evidence presented at trial that Charlynda knew that she was dealing with a 
synthetic cannabinoid. (R. p. 1005-1008.) A specific example of the court's 
ruling, which happened to apply to a delivery count, follows: 
As discussed above, there is ample evidence that Goggin knew she 
was dealing with a synthetic cannabinoid. What she may not have 
known was that synthetic cannabinoids in Twizted Potpourri were 
illegal. However, mistake of law is not a defense to Count III. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Motion For Judgment of 
Acquittal and Defendant's Motion for A New Trial (hereinafter Memorandum 
Decision) at p. 6. (R. p. 1008.) 
3 While the motion and memorandum in support of reviewed motion for judgment 
of acquittal specifically requested a judgment of acquittal on all four counts, it did 
not make a separate argument for the conspiracy to deliver paraphernalia. (R. p. 
934.) However, it is just a combination of the arguments described above. 
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Later, the court concluded: 
Goggin's motion for acquittal is grounded in her reliance on Morgan 
Alley's assurance that the plant substance she helped package and 
sell contained no illegal substances. His assurance that the 
substance is legal does not make it legal. There is sUbstantial 
evidence upon which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Goggin knew she was dealing with a synthetic cannabinoid. 
Memorandum Decision at p. 8-9. (R. p. 1008-1009.) 
The court is wrong for two reasons. First, Appellant asserts as is shown 
above, there was not substantial evidence upon which a jury could find 
Charlynda knew she was dealing with a synthetic cannabinoid because the direct 
evidence was actually that she did not know. 
In addition to the direct evidence, the circumstances also strongly support 
that she did not know the potpourri was il/egal. Certainly with respect to the 
conspiracy counts which require Charlynda's entry into an agreement to break 
the law (and not just commit the underlying act), it simply makes no sense for the 
$9 an hour employee to conspire to break the law with the person who was able 
to pay $35,000 for the materials for his next batch. While Morgan Alley's net 
profit was not calculated at trial, in rough figures his gross profit on the near 
40,000 containers of Twizted Potpourri seized, if retailed at the minimum of $5 
each, is $200,000. Again, it simply makes no sense that Charlynda would agree 
to break the law with Morgan Alley given the gross disparity in the potential 
reward for doing so, and any jury finding that she so conspired would have to be 
based on speculation, not substantial evidence. 
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Second, even assuming for the sake of argument that the court is correct 
and Charlynda knew she was dealing with a synthetic cannabinoid, it is wrong 
when it concludes therefrom that it is not a defense that she mistakenly believed 
the synthetic cannabinoids contained in the Twizted Potpourri were legal. 
The district court itself gave an example during the trial which it then later 
failed to apply to the case. As the district court explained, our case is similar to a 
person who walks into the grocery store to buy a cold drink on a hot day and tells 
the clerk that he is thirsty but is driving, and asks whether a particular drink 
contains any alcohol. The clerk says no, the person opens it and goes on his 
way, but is stopped by police and 10 and behold there is alcohol in the drink, and 
he is charged with an open container. According to the district court, the person's 
mistaken belief that there was no alcohol in that can would give him defense if 
the jury believed it. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2738, In. 16-p. 2739, In. 3. 
In other words, even though the person in this hypothetical is in fact aware 
that some beverages contain alcohol which makes its possession while driving a 
crime, relying on the clerk's incorrect advice that this particular beverage 
contained no alcohol is a defense. 
The same is true here, Charlynda is told by someone who is believed to 
know (like the store clerk) that the product contains nothing illegal. So even if 
she knew that some potpourri contains outlawed synthetic cannabinoids Oust like 
the person knew that some drinks contain alcohol), her mistaken belief that the 
instant potpourri does not contain them is a defense. 
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Thus, since the district court confuses mistake of fact and mistake of law, 
it is incorrect when it ultimately denies the motion for acquittal on the four counts 
even if it found substantial evidence that Charlynda knew she was dealing with a 
synthetic cannabinoid. Therefore, for either of the two reasons, Charlynda's 
convictions on two counts of conspiracy and two counts of delivery must be 
reversed and acquittals entered. 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL AS TO THE DELIVERY COUNTS 
In the alternative, Appellant asserts that the district court erred when it 
only granted the motion for new trial on the conspiracy counts instead of granting 
it for all of the counts. Therefore, reversal and new trial on the two substantive 
counts is required because the jury instructions were misleading. 
As explained in State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62 (Ct. App. 2005): 
Idaho law permits a new trial if the court misdirected the jury on a 
matter of law. I.C. § 19-2406(5). Idaho Criminal Rule 34 outlines the 
standard that the trial court applies when considering a motion for a 
new trial, directing that "the court ... may grant a new trial to the 
defendant if required in the interest of justice." Whether the 
interests of justice require a new trial is a question that is committed 
to the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be 
disturbed absent a showing of manifest abuse. In this case, the 
new trial motion turned upon the propriety of a jury instruction, a 
matter on which this Court exercises free review. If the instructions 
taken as a whole, and not individually, fairly and adequately present 
the issues, state the applicable law, and do not mislead the jury or 
prejudice a party, then there is no reversible error. 
Id., p. 64 (internal citations omitted). 
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Further, as the Court of Appeals explained in State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 
666 (Ct. App. 2012): 
An erroneous instruction that relieves the State of its burden to 
prove an element of a charged crime can be characterized as 
either a violation of due process, State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 
588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011); State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 
743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007); see also Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278,113 S. Ct. 2078,124 L. Ed. 2d 182 
(1993); or as a violation of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial 
guarantee. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12, 119 S. Ct. 
1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999); Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277-78 .... 
Id. p. 669. 
In our case, after many arguments and machinations at trial, the court 
gave jury instructions which provided that a mistake of fact may be a defense to 
a conspiracy (ICJI 1510) and also, that a mistake of law is no defense (lCJI 
1510). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
For a defendant to be guilty of conspiracy, the state must prove the 
defendant had a particular intent. Evidence was offered that at the 
time of the alleged offense the defendant mistakenly believed 
certain facts. You should consider such evidence in determining 
whether the defendant had the required intent. 
If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the 
defendant had such intent, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
R. p. 889. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
When the evidence shows that a person voluntarily did that which 
the law declares to be a crime, it is no defense that the person did 
not know that the act was unlawful or that the person believed it to 
be lawful. 
R. p. 890. 
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Following the trial, Charlynda (and others) filed a motion for a new trial on 
the grounds that the District Court had misdirected the jury in a matter of law and 
erred in the decision of a question of law and that the verdict was contrary to law 
or evidence. (R. p. 928.) In her memorandum in support, Charlynda highlighted 
the relevant facts as follows: 
1) Morgan Alley believed the substance, AM-2201, he sprayed 
upon the green plant material was legal. Ms. Goggin was told she 
would be selling 'Twizted Potpourri' and that the substance was 
legal. 
2) Mr. Alley was the only one who sprayed the illegal chemical AM-
2201 on otherwise legal plant material, and he was the only one 
who had knowledge of the chemical. 
3) Mr. Alley did not know that JWH-019 or JWH-210 was in his 
'Twizted Potpourri,' and he never told Ms. Goggin that either of 
those chemicals was present. 
4) Through the testimonies of Detective Andreoli and Morgan Alley, 
the jury learned that Ms. Goggin believed it was legal. 
5) There was testimony from Detective Andreoli that Ms. Goggin 
knew the 'Twizted Potpourri' was to be smoked, but there was no 
testimony as to why anyone would smoke it. 
6) There was no testimony that Ms. Goggin knew that Mr. Alley was 
spraying the legal green plant material with either AM-2201 or any 
other synthetic cannabinoid. 
7) There was no testimony that Ms. Goggin knew it was illegal. 
8) There was no testimony that Ms. Goggin agreed to commit any 
crime, but that Ms. Goggin simply agreed to work for Mr. Alley for 
an amount just above minimum wage. 
9) There was some evidence adduced at trial regarding Ms. 
Goggin's knowledge as to the glassware, including the fact that 
there were items sold in The Red Eye Hut that had marijuana-leaf 
logos on them, and that drug-test kits were sold in the store. 
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10) There was also evidence that The Red Eye Hut had multiple 
signs indicating that the glassware was for tobacco use only and 
that Ms. Goggin, as the cashier, was to eject anyone from the store 
that spoke of either ingesting 'Twizted Potpourri,' or mentioned illicit 
substances. 
R. p. 936-937. 
Charlynda brought (and brings) her claims pursuant to her Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right as well as her rights to due process and a fair trial as 
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, §§ 7, 13, 18, and 21 of the Idaho Constitution. 
(R. p. 927.) Charlynda argued that Instruction 27 relieved the State from having 
to prove that she knowingly delivered a controlled substance because it relieved 
the State of the need to prove that she knew the substance delivered was a 
controlled substance. (R. p. 943.) The same was true for the conspiracy counts 
because Instruction 27 relieved the State of its requirement of proving that 
Charlynda and another entered into an agreement to accomplish an illegal 
objective. (R. p. 942-944.) In other words, the mistake of law instruction removed 
the specific intent element from the crimes of conspiracy and the knowledge 
element from the crimes of delivery. (R. p. 944.) 
The District Court granted the new trial motion as to both the conspiracy 
counts: 
While it was perfectly proper for this Court to give instruction no. 27, 
mistake of the law, the jury should have been advised that it was 
applicable only to Counts III and IV, and did not apply to the 
conspiracy counts. Evidence was introduced at trial from which a 
jury could have concluded that the defendant lacked the necessary 
intent to violate the law so as to be guilty of conspiracy even though 
the acts she agreed to perform constituted the underlying crime. 
The jury should have been instructed that a good faith belief the 
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object crime was not illegal is a defense to conspiracy. In the 
context of this case, failure of this Court to properly instruct the jury 
on a Defendant's defense is both an error in the directions to the 
jury and an error in the decision of a question of law. As provided 
in Idaho Code § 19-2406(5), Defendant is entitled to a new trial in 
the instruct of justice on Count I, conspiracy to manufacture with 
intent to deliver a controlled substance. 
While the evidence of a good faith belief in the legality of the 
paraphernalia is slender, a properly instructed jury could conclude 
from the evidence that Goggin was unaware the plant material was 
an illegal synthetic cannabinoid and therefore a controlled 
substance. From there a jury could also conclude that the state 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the glass and metal 
pipes, bongs, scales, and containers were drug paraphernalia. The 
defendant is also entitled to a new trial, in the interest of justice, on 
Count II. 
Memorandum Decision, p. 15. (R. p. 1015). 
However, the court held that "[t]he same considerations do not apply to 
the charge contained in Counts III and IV," and denied a new trial on the delivery 
counts. (R. p. 1015.) 
The court is wrong, however, because the combination of Instruction 27 
(mistake of law) along with Instruction 26 that provides that the mistake of fact 
defense only applies to the conspiracy counts, could have misled the jury into 
believing that it had to convict Charlynda of the delivery counts even if she was 
unaware of the nature of the sUbstance (as opposed to its illegality). In other 
words, since the jury is told that mistake of law is not a defense and that the only 
mistake of fact defense applies to the conspiracy counts, this negates her 
mistake of fact defense which should have been allowed, just like the 
hypothetical person could claim he did not know there was alcohol in the drink or 
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that the substance was cocaine and not sugar. Therefore, the court erred when it 
failed to grant a new trial on the two delivery counts as well. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Goggin requests this Court reverse the district court's denial of her 
motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts, or in the alternative, remand this 
matter for a new trial on all the counts, including the delivery 
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